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The GCC States: Participation, Opposition and the Fraying of the Social 
Contract 
J. E. PETERSON 
Abstract 
While the popular discontent visibly sweeping the Arab world in 2011–12 has not had 
the same impact on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, there have been serious 
repercussions and doubts have been raised about the legitimacy of the political systems. 
Causes of unrest include economic grievances, sectarian discrimination, and frustration 
at the lack of effective political participation. Many citizens reject the validity of 
existing avenues for informal participation and demand reform of the system and more 
substantial participation in it. Civil society remains restricted by government 
obstructions. The window to public advocacy of change and even replacement of 
existing regimes has been opened, particularly in Bahrain. Social media play an 
increasing role in disseminating ideas and information, in circulating grievances, and in 
organizing demonstrations. Ruling families have been slow and reluctant to respond, 
thus threatening to unravel the implicit social contract between rulers and ruled. 
Tensions are not likely to be resolved in the near future. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, or the Gulf states) are all authoritarian 
monarchies. They differ somewhat from other Arab monarchies in Jordan and Morocco in that 
the ruling families arise from the tribal environment that continues to predominate in Gulf 
societies, although the importance of that tribal context has been reduced drastically in the 
political arena. Nevertheless, the twelve ruling families (constituting the leadership of the 
seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates [UAE] plus the other five GCC states) enjoy 
relatively strong legitimacy because they are an integral element of the ‘traditional’ political 
environment.
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 There are many who would take issue with the above statement. Indeed, the popular 
discontent visibly sweeping the Arab world in 2011 has produced an explosion of opinions on 
the validity of the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Gulf states or, as a slightly larger group, the Arab 
monarchies. This is a subject that has been debated for many years, particularly during the 
period of Nasirism and the heyday of Arab secular ideologies and then again after the Iranian 
Revolution and the rise of Islamist politics. An implicit argument in favour of 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘traditional’ is highly imprecise but is used here to refer to the composition of society and the exercise 
of politics in the pre-oil era. Admittedly, it is susceptible to interpretation as representing a state in which society 
and politics remained static and unchanging before the oil era. In truth, traditional societies were constantly in a 
state of flux, even though the organizational and relational precepts remained essentially unaltered. Nevertheless, 
use of the term provides a useful prism with which to contrast social and political change in the oil era. 
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‘exceptionalism’ is that the point has been argued about this region for more than half a 
century. 
 At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that many of the same factors that spur 
popular opinions and at least potential dissent throughout the Arab world (and in many parts 
of the larger developing world as well) are also at work in the Gulf states. The unrest of 2011–
12 in Bahrain – the hardest-hit of the Gulf states – was provoked in large part by economic 
factors related to discrimination against the majority Shi˓ah, both al-Baharinah and Persians. 
Sectarian discrimination was also the cause of protests in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. 
Oman’s demonstrations were triggered initially by economic grievances, while the arrests and 
convictions of bloggers in the UAE were prompted by complaints about the lack of political 
participation on the one hand and by the government’s fears of growing Islamist strength on 
the other. 
 Still, it is clear that the emphasis on denial of the ‘exceptionalism’ argument relies heavily 
on the concept of the rentier state, which is only one of the two pillars of regime legitimacy. It 
may be said that the Gulf monarchies owe their authority to a combination of what may be 
called ‘traditional’ legitimacy and ‘modern’ legitimacy. Traditional legitimacy derives from 
the tribal and cultural environment in which these states developed and that their societies 
continue to embrace. The ruling families form an integral part of the tribal system and their 
status is accepted generally as natural. The culture demands respect for the father as head of 
the family – and, by extension, elders of the community – whose word should be final and 
unquestioned. The ruler’s position as head of state is an extrapolation of that patriarchal 
principle, that is, the ruler is the father of the state and its citizens, just as the tribal shaykh is 
the father of the tribe and its members. 
One school of thought holds that continuity is the predominant force in the Gulf states. The 
[Arab Gulf states] … are essentially at the pre-modern stage of development as they have 
been for centuries. They are still in essence traditional societies wrapped in a façade of 
modernity. … Indeed, the net impact of the oil wealth of the 1970s and the 1990s has been the 
consolidation of the existing medieval order. … Tribalism, traditionalism and even unhealthy 
sectarianism are back and seem to be decidedly stronger. … The [Gulf states] have been 
cogently resistant to change and most probably will remain so for years to come.
 
(Abdulla 
2010: 12–13) 
 At the same time, it can be argued this return to retrogressive conservatism is but one 
phase in a longer-term process of gradual and inevitable change. Thus, at a more fundamental  
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level, inevitable decline in the acceptance of traditional legitimacy has been ameliorated, if not 
countered, by the regimes’ reliance on ‘modern’ legitimacy. This is the assumption of the 
central political tenet of rentier state theory: the citizenry accept the authority of the state, as 
well as the denial of their formal political participation, because the state provides security – 
both domestic and external – and a comprehensive distribution of the rent (oil income). In 
short, it fulfils the material expectations that states are expected to. Obviously, this 
requirement is easiest to fulfil when oil prices, and thus state incomes, are high. It is equally 
obvious that as societies change and citizens become better educated and increasingly exposed 
to the outside world, the denial of political rights becomes less acceptable. 
 According to the view that change is the predominant factor in the Gulf states, it follows 
that the rapid pace of deep socioeconomic change produces serious challenges for Gulf 
regimes. 
These states are pregnant with all types of changes, some deep-rooted and structural and some 
superficial and cosmetic. … The largely traditional and conservative ways of life have been 
almost completely replaced. … A more modern, urban and distinctly affluent society is 
coming into being. … The [negative effects of change] include the unequal distribution of oil 
wealth, a considerable amount of psychological dislocation and disorientation resulting in 
increasing social alienation, growth of a highly individualistic culture, conspicuous 
consumption, a deepening of dependency and the presence of large number of foreigners. … 
The [Gulf states] have experienced an ‘avalanche of changes’ which have engulfed policies, 
societies, infrastructure, values and economies, all of which are converting the [Gulf states] 
into postmodern societies geared to the world economy. (Abdulla 2010: 14–15) 
 Embracing this paradigm of change, many observers contend that the legitimacy of the 
Gulf states is tenuous and has been stretched dangerously by the Arab unrest of 2011. Even 
more, it has been said that the ‘triumphalism’ in the GCC about escaping the turbulence and 
thus being able to provide Arab leadership is unwarranted. For example, a piece posted on 
Foreign Policy’s website in late 2011 contends that ‘History and current trends suggest that 
the GCC’s current leading role will prove the exception, not the rule, and likely won’t survive 
the coming years’ (Lynch 2011). An article in Foreign Affairs, also in 2011, remarked that 
‘Buoyed by high oil prices, the other oil exporters have been able to head off potential 
opposition by distributing resources through increased state salaries, higher subsidies for 
consumer goods, new state jobs, and direct handouts to citizens’ (Gause 2011: 85). Another, 
noting the relationship between taxation and representation, contended that ‘In the Middle 
East today, oil-funded leaders typically respond to demands for greater accountability by 
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offering new handouts, lowering taxes, or both – and this usually works’ (Ross 2011: 3–4).2 
The problem with postulating that the Gulf regimes stave off opposition by bribing their 
populations is that it ignores the still-evident power of traditional legitimacy. 
 It is undeniable that the traditional environment has undergone massive change in the 45–
75 years that have marked the oil era. Traditional politics no longer suffice as the sole means 
of maintaining power. Societies have expanded, government and administration have become 
more elaborate, relationships between members of society are more diffuse, and traditional 
patron–client relationships have been partially supplanted by newer, emerging relationships 
based on education, occupation and professional or vocational interests. One consequence has 
been the introduction of formal political institutions in all six GCC states on the national and 
local levels to give the semblance of a sharing of power or at least of popular participation in 
the political process. But the effectiveness and writ of these institutions remain extremely 
limited. 
 While the parliamentary experience in the GCC cannot be written off as mere window-
dressing, it is inescapable that the Gulf states remain authoritarian states and that their 
hereditary rulers and accompanying ruling families ultimately retain unchallenged control. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that a number of fissures old and new have emerged, 
particularly over the last two decades, in that authoritarian wall that permit a significant level 
of participation and engagement in more informal yet still meaningful ways. Progress on this 
front has been slow and in Bahrain, and to a lesser extent in Oman, the experience of the Arab 
uprising of 2011 has seriously challenged the notion that Gulf authoritarianism is mellowing. 
 Ruling families in the Gulf have taken note of the process of changing circumstances and 
expectations and generally have offered at least rhetoric that acknowledges the necessity of 
reforms. Shaykh Nasir al-Muhammad Al Sabah, while prime minister of Kuwait in mid-2011, 
told the press that ‘We believe that the reform process in all the (Gulf) countries is an 
important and crucial matter. It is not possible to realize growth and stability in any country 
without economic and political reforms and to realize welfare of the peoples’ (al-Hayat 2011). 
This sentiment was echoed by Qatar’s prime minister (and foreign minister), Shaykh Hamad 
b. Jasim b. Jabr Al Thani, who remarked in an interview that the GCC states were not immune 
                                                 
2
 In the same vein is the remark that ‘First, and foremost, the GCC states have a lot of money. That may not buy 
love, but it certainly does give them something to work with, especially as energy prices stay high. Most have 
responded to the Arab uprisings by throwing huge amounts of money at their own people in order to blunt the 
demands for political change’ (Ross 2011: 3–4). To be fair, Lynch (2011) also notes that ‘The wealthy Gulf states 
seem relatively immune to the popular mobilizations which have challenged most of the other regimes in the 
region. Advocates of the Gulf exceptionalism stance point to small citizen populations, huge government 
employment and patronage opportunities, and monarchical legitimacy as buffers against popular outrage.’ 
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to popular revolts but the relationship between the people and the rulers in these countries was 
stronger than in other countries in the region. When asked if the Arab uprising was applicable 
to the Gulf states, Shaykh Hamad replied: 
My testimony would not be complete because I am part of the system in the Gulf countries. 
But I can’t say that GCC countries are hundred per cent immune. The truth is that the GCC 
has always been flexible. The relationships between the ruler and the citizens in the region is 
different from other countries. There is keenness to preserve the traditions and customs and 
more communication and understanding between the top and the bottom.
 
(Akhbar al-Yawm 
2011) 
 It is instructive to examine briefly how the political scene in the Gulf has been transformed 
over the last 40–70 years. The evolutionary path of the Gulf states can be described as having 
moved through three phases. The hereditary leadership in the first phase, that of the pre-oil 
era, was largely unquestioned but the effective power of that leadership was constrained by a 
variety of factors. Among them were external influences (particularly the role of the British in 
most of the states), the poverty of the polity and therefore the rulers’ dependence on 
cooperation with prominent merchants, the ability of family factions and tribal groups simply 
to move out of the geographical limits of a ruler’s control, and – at least in theory – the 
consensual nature of tribal politics. 
 The introduction of the oil era, from the beginning of exploitation through full 
independence and beyond into the 1970s and early 1980s, constituted the second phase. As 
recipients of oil rents, rulers and their families quickly acquired vastly extended control over 
their states and used that wealth to create dependency across the breadth of their citizenry. 
Elites were co-opted through government appointments and especially through expanded 
commercial opportunities. The distribution of benefits derived from oil wealth in the creation 
of physical and social infrastructure served to ensure the loyalty as well as dependence of the 
population as a whole. Above all, ruling families exerted strong control over their populations 
by such means as determining advancement in the civil service and military according to 
loyalty; parcelling out financial opportunities and benefits through a wide network of elites, 
supporters and constituent groups; maintaining severe censorship of all media; and prohibiting 
public dissent and sanctioning private dissenters. 
 The third phase, the maturing of oil regimes from the 1990s until the present, has seen a 
certain loosening of the strong and often heavy-handed authoritarianism exercised in the 
second phase by rulers and ruling families. An educated, sophisticated and well-to-do middle 
class that is not directly dependent on the regime has burgeoned in all six countries. This 
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middle class in all six countries exhibits an undercurrent of yearning for greater transparency 
and effective legislative institutions. Yet the ruling families have resisted effective power-
sharing in all states. Formal political institutions, such as parliamentary or consultative bodies, 
serve some useful functions but their effective role remains severely restricted. 
 The evolution of more ‘traditional’ informal institutions and the cautious adoption or 
tolerance of newer ones has come to the fore in this third phase. Governments’ ‘big brother’ 
attitude to control over media and the expression of opinion has gradually loosened, assisted 
by the spread of satellite television and the Internet. The institution of the majlis or diwaniyah 
continues to play a limited but useful role in legitimation. But elements of civil society have 
taken hold, particularly as society changes and new networks of association are formed to 
complement traditional ones of family, tribe and sect. In Kuwait and Bahrain, political 
groupings or societies have been tolerated and these have begun to form nascent political 
parties along ideological as well as primordial lines. 
 Finally, factionalism within ruling families has taken on an added dimension. While these 
families have always exhibited widely divergent opinions internally on how to exercise power 
– and on occasion have resorted to dramatic strategies to secure succession – divergence has 
appeared to deepen in the last decade or two. In most of these states, the existence of opposing 
views on democratization has become apparent within the families and a new generation of 
rulers in some states has produced more ‘liberal’ leadership to a certain extent. Ruling family 
factions have sought alliances with other elite groups and, as in the case of Kuwait, allegedly 
have been manifested in the orchestration of public opposition to members of opposing 
factions, especially in the Majlis al-Umma (National Assembly).
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 The structure of the Gulf states regimes, employing essentially authoritarian characters, 
seems to continue without serious challenge. Formal political participation is extremely 
limited, even in Kuwait with its parliament. Consequently, political participation is informal at 
best in most cases and political engagement of the citizenry with their governments is tentative 
and supplicatory. There is a changing dynamic to such activity but there seems to be 
movement in both positive and negative directions, as is shown below. 
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An alternative scheme of stages has been advanced by Abdulkhaleq Abdulla: ‘Since the end of the Second 
World War the Gulf has experienced four major phases: pre-modernity in 1950–70, the first stage of modernity in 
1971–90, the second stage of modernity in 1990–2010, and finally the global moment of 2010 onwards’ (Abdulla 
2010: 7ff). 
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2. STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF GULF POLITICS 
Pre-oil politics in the Gulf states was characterized by leadership that was in an almost literal 
sense more paternalistic than authoritarian. Its foundation lay in the notion of the ruler serving 
as the ‘father of his country’. This paternalistic leadership presumably derived from the role of 
the shaykh over his tribe, which mimicked the position of the father within the family. The 
extension of this attitude to the ruler owed much to Gulf society’s respect for elders as well as 
the persistence of a ‘traditional’ corporate entity: the ruler, like the shaykh and like the father, 
personified the bonds and identity of the community and held responsibility for safeguarding 
that community’s interest, as well as exercising authority within it. The consensual 
relationship between ruler and ruled was facilitated by the compactness of society. There were 
personal relations of one sort or another, as well as family ties and corporate links, between all 
members of society. 
 Leadership was exercised directly by the ruler, often by decisions reached in open court 
after ascertaining the opinions of his advisers, family members and other notables of the local 
society. The ruler’s word – or conclusion – was sufficient to arbitrate disputes and bind the 
state to relations with other states (both neighbouring and more external). Once a ruler 
announced his decision, dissent could not be brooked. His word was final and opposing it 
generally meant expulsion from the community. 
 The onset of the oil era produced changes. The accretion of oil revenues to the ruler not 
only strengthened his control over the state but also intensified the role of the ruler as 
benefactor and distributor of state expenditure. In addition to establishing allowances for 
members of the ruling family, the state – as personified by the ruler – created rudimentary 
ministries (such as public works). The government agencies served another function besides 
carrying out initial development projects: their formation was often directly tied to the 
establishment of fiefdoms for senior ruling family members. 
 Other well-placed figures of society, particularly heads of merchant families, benefited 
from government programs intended to distribute wealth. These programs generally centred 
on government development contracts as well as land sales and purchases. At the same time, 
the foundations of welfare societies were created as a result of the rulers acting in their 
traditionally expected paternal role. 
 In this way, the ‘traditional’ political roles were reinforced through the liberating effect of 
additional income. But the end result, particularly as oil revenues increased exponentially with 
growing production, was an intensification of the power of rulers and their families. The gap 
between ruler and ruled, particularly the elites of the society, had never been very wide, but 
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the chasm broadened with the oil era. Ruling families were increasingly set off from the rest of 
society and became castes to which no non-members could possibly aspire. 
 A measure of limited ‘consultative’ participation by the elite remained, principally through 
personal ties to the ruler or close relatives, or exercised in majlises or diwaniyahs. 
Participation by most citizens, circumscribed at best in the past, was rendered almost entirely 
supplicatory. The open majlis, to which everyone had access, frequently became little more 
than a venue for receiving petitions from individuals (including expatriates as well as citizens) 
for a job, expenses for a medical trip abroad, or similar benefits. The so-called ‘desert 
democracy’ was thereby transformed into a televised opportunity for the ruler to show his 
connection to and approachability by the people. 
 At the same time, the status of the ruler as the father of his people was given strong and 
deliberate emphasis. He, it was postulated, ‘knew best for his people’ and therefore his word 
was absolute. The state, which was rapidly becoming a tangible organ with a differentiated 
hierarchy and growing bureaucracy, was the instrument for carrying out the ruler’s commands. 
Its role vis-à-vis the people was to provide the benefits that the state – that is, the ruler – felt 
were needed and appropriate. Effective participation was restricted to employment of the 
newly educated citizens in key government positions, where they could participate in shaping 
the choices from which the ruler would make his decision. 
 At the same time, the state began to exercise control over the expression and activities of 
its people to an extent not seen before. In part, the solidification of states, the determination of 
national boundaries, and the issuing of passports and classification of citizens contributed to 
this process. Control extended to thought. Ministries of ‘information’ (sic) determined what 
should be published in newspapers and aired on radio and television. The access of the citizen 
to external sources of news and ideas was subject to strict censorship. Educational curricula 
followed a rigid government line that extolled the virtues of the state and excoriated any 
ideological deviations. 
 Kuwait and Bahrain created institutions of formal political participation upon their full 
independence, more as a tool to demonstrate their legitimacy as viable independent states than 
as a genuine initial step towards power-sharing.
4
 Kuwait’s Amir ˓Abdullah al-Salim created 
the National Assembly shortly after independence as a tangible proof that Kuwait was a real 
state; that is, it must be so because only sovereign states had elected parliaments. The National 
Assembly has had a chequered history and has been suspended a number of times. It has not 
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 The literature on formal participatory institutions in the Gulf states is voluminous and cannot be cited here. This 
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served as a true parliament, either in its structure or in its operation, but its elected 
representatives fulfil many of the basic intentions of representative democracy and even the 
Islamist/liberal confrontation is played out in part in public debate. 
 Bahrain, which acquired full independence ten years after Kuwait, followed Kuwait’s 
example, both in the drafting of a constitution and in the creation of a national assembly to 
bolster its image as a sovereign state. The experiment was a dismal failure since the 
government permanently suspended the National Assembly after just two years and no attempt 
was made to resurrect it for nearly three decades. The new bicameral assembly (one elected 
and one appointed) created by King Hamad b. ˓Isa in 2002 was crafted to ensure that it would 
not be able to oppose the government as had happened in the early 1970s, as well as ensure 
that the country’s majority Shi˓ah would never have a parliamentary majority. 
 The other Gulf states were content with only creating consultative bodies. These often 
served in effect as formalized majlises through the appointment of community leaders and 
educated citizens. Thus they allowed a combination of formal and informal participation to the 
elites of the community. Oman gradually extended universal suffrage to its body, the UAE has 
broadened its narrow electoral base cautiously, and Qatar has promised a national assembly 
but has yet to deliver. Only Saudi Arabia’s Majlis al-Shura remains fully appointed. In 
addition, elections were instituted for municipal councils in some of the states. 
 In the last stage of evolution, as the Gulf states grew in confidence and durability, they 
became more formal, more diversified and, at the same time, more impersonal. In part, this 
was a function of mushrooming growth in the indigenous population, occasioned by improved 
health care and better standards of living. The sheer numbers of people meant it was no longer 
possible to know everyone else in society. Such activities as visiting one’s parents every day 
and meeting regularly with one’s peers became more difficult because of the press of time and 
the pressure of traffic. As a consequence, personal ties became more fragmented and select. 
 At the same time, all the Gulf states experienced a massive influx of non-citizens, 
including northern Arabs, Asians and Westerners. All of these had different but significant 
impacts on the composition of society and political attitudes. Arab expatriates were favoured 
as Arabic- speakers and because of cultural similarities, but also suspect because of their 
potential for ideological influences upon the citizenry. The prevalence of Palestinian teachers 
in the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, led to Gulf school children being intensely 
imbued with the Palestinian plight. 
                                                                                                                                                         
brief discussion follows in large part from Peterson (1988) and the update, Peterson (2006). 
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 In terms of structure, the state produced a certain maturation of the machinery of 
government. The few scattered agencies that marked the initial phase of government 
developed into a burgeoning trend of formal institutions – ministries, royal court 
organizations, security organs, audit bureaus and so on – as well as a growing bureaucracy. As 
citizens achieved more education and population growth meant more demand for jobs for 
nationals, the proportion of citizens in all levels of government positions grew – not just at the 
top and at the bottom. The increasing proportion of government employees vis-à-vis private 
sector workers naturally served to increase dependence on the state. 
 Furthermore, the state was able to exert considerable control over its citizens through 
effective intelligence and policing. Dissent was tolerated no more than it was in the Arab 
republics. Admittedly, treatment of dissidents or critics was generally much gentler: ‘errant 
children’ were rehabilitated and encouraged to return to the fold – co-opted, in other words. 
As one example, a Kuwaiti who fled his country after involvement in a plot to assassinate the 
Shah of Iran during the latter’s state visit to the emirate was subsequently captured with a 
group of rebels in Oman. After Kuwait successfully pressed for his return, he was not jailed 
but sent to the United States to pursue his PhD, and then joined Kuwait University and later 
served as minister of education. 
 But even as the state was becoming stronger and more capable, elements of social change 
began to reduce the state’s (legitimate) hold on its citizens. The state replaced other, more 
traditional, corporate bodies as the main source of authority and identity for nationals, as 
demonstrated by the ubiquitous displays of flags and pictures of rulers at sporting events. But 
the spread of education, especially abroad, led to new attitudes regarding responsible 
government. The old acceptance of paternalism was being tempered with newer critical 
attitudes demanding government answerability and obligations. 
 The advent of satellite television and the Internet increased exposure to conflicting ideas 
and ideologies, even for those individuals who were not highly educated or who had not left 
their villages, and these innovations accelerated critical attitudes towards government. At the 
same time, new connections and bonds emerged to complement if not replace older ones. 
These included such groups as professional societies, alumni groups, chambers of commerce, 
and avocational groups such as scuba-divers, radio hams and amateur musicians. 
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3. INFORMAL AVENUES OF ENGAGEMENT 
Some avenues for informal participation have existed traditionally. To be sure, most of these 
avenues, or means of access, were restricted to the elites. Rulers were not absolute and most 
depended on consensus within their families – immediate family members in the first instance 
and then the wider body of the ruling family – and on consultation with leading merchants and 
religious figures. Before oil, administration of the state and particularly the conduct of any 
warfare required loans from the important merchants, who then claimed a say in commercial 
and other policies. In Saudi Arabia, the Al Sa˓ud had formed a virtual partnership with the Al 
al-Shaykh, the descendants of Muhammad ˓Abd al-Wahhab who formulated the Islamic 
reform movement that prevails in the kingdom today. The Al Sa˓ud also formed political and 
marriage alliances with key families such as Ibn Jiluwi and al-Sudayr. 
 From another angle, and to return to a point made at the beginning of this paper, the 
traditional institution of the majlis or diwaniyah continues to play a political, as well as social, 
role in the Gulf states. Its appellation of ‘desert democracy’ was in recognition of the ready 
accessibility of leaders, from the ruler of the state down to the shaykhs of tribes, to their 
constituents. Even today, in most of the states, senior members of the ruling family, senior 
government officials, prominent merchants and other notables hold weekly or more frequent 
‘open houses’ in which anyone can come to meet them, discuss a wide range of matters, and 
often receive a meal. To be sure, few venture to say anything too critical of their host or the 
government – and many of these majlises focus on non-political subjects such as poetry or are 
simply social gatherings. 
 Nevertheless, they provide feedback on popular opinion that on occasion has led to 
reversals of government policy. In the mid-1980s, the government enacted an income tax that 
applied only to expatriates. Merchants were shocked, since either their employees would leave 
because their income was no longer attractive or companies would become less profitable if 
higher wages were paid. The matter was raised in the majlises of prominent merchants, 
provincial governors and key members of the royal family. Some 24 hours later, the decree 
was rescinded in an unacknowledged display of political feedback (interviews in Saudi Arabia 
1988). In Kuwait, the elected members of the National Assembly hold diwaniyahs that serve 
much the same function as the constituent meetings that Western MPs hold. 
 Still, it should be noted that as a forum for regular consultation and advice, the majlis or 
diwayniyah has declined markedly in recent decades. Society has become more complex, 
modern life has become more hectic (allowing less time for face-to-face or casual meetings), 
and formal government procedures and hierarchical chains of policy-planning have replaced 
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informal discussions. The majlis or diwaniyah is often little more than a social occasion, 
where men gather in the evenings, drink tea and exchange views and information. It may be an 
important socializing ritual but generally it carefully stays clear of discussion of sensitive 
political issues, let alone of playing any organizing function. 
4. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society has emerged late in the Gulf and has been hobbled by the double impact of 
persistent corporate identities and strong state interference in what would otherwise be civil 
society activities. All societies or professional organizations require government approval for 
their establishment and many times this has been difficult or impossible to obtain. One reason 
is government suspicion that an organization may engage in political activities. But there are 
other reasons as well. 
 Charitable groups may be seen by the government as an implicit accusation that the state 
has not been fulfilling its responsibilities to all the community. Women’s organizations were 
often created by ministries of social affairs as deliberate vehicles for educating women on 
their role in ‘modern’ society, preserving traditional – read ‘paternalistic’ – attitudes towards 
the state, or introducing or preserving craft work as a suitable economic endeavour for 
women. Governments have also sought to manipulate women’s organizations for political 
purposes. These can be seen, for example, in Kuwait’s creation of Islamist women’s societies 
for their value ‘not so much in perpetuating gender inequalities as in disseminating patriotic 
values and curbing the influence of fundamentalism’ (al-Mughni 2001: 186). 
 Other groups, such as hobbyist clubs or graduate societies, may emerge as private 
initiatives but are enveloped by official support and control. The state universities remain 
under tight control and intellectual inquiry often is either not appreciated or discouraged by 
supervisors. Trade unions are either banned or hollow shells. Islamic organizations have been 
encouraged by states in the past, largely because they were perceived as means of reinforcing 
resistance to ‘liberal’ forces. In the post-9/11 world, however, states have become more 
suspicious of Islamists and have exercised tighter control over civil religious groups. 
 In counterpoint, it can be noted that the Gulf Forum, an annual gathering of intellectuals 
from all Gulf states to discuss pertinent social and economic issues, is alive and well. A first 
meeting in Muscat years ago foundered when Omani security demanded the minutes of the 
meeting; the group has not been back since. In recent years, it has settled on Bahrain as a 
regular venue, but the events of 2011 forced a move to Dubai (interviews in Kuwait, April 
2012). On the other hand, it has been observed that civil society and political activism have 
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flourished in the last few years in Kuwait, with, for example, many younger people taking an 
active stance in visiting schools and other venues to explain the state’s constitution and 
educate people about the necessity of voting (interviews in Kuwait, April 2012). 
 For all these reasons, the role of civil society in politics in the Gulf states remains minimal. 
As one Gulf national has noted, ‘Civil society is emasculated as in much of the Third World’ 
(interview in the Gulf, February 2012). States actively intervene in activities by enforcing 
restrictions, dictating articles of incorporation, influencing elections, and suspending 
organizations and detaining their leaders when there has been criticism of the state. This has 
been particularly prevalent in Bahrain, where the government is suspicious of professional 
organizations and has dismantled many and created pliant ones in their stead. 
 But it is also true in, for example, the UAE, where a petition calling for political reform in 
March 2011 was followed by the arrest of five activists. They were subsequently convicted 
and sentenced to prison terms, although later pardoned. Furthermore, the elected boards of the 
Jurists’ Association and the Teachers’ Association were disbanded in 2011 because some of 
their board members had supported petitions to the government. Another activist’s arrest 
followed in March 2012. These actions, taken during the year of Arab unrest, had been 
preceded by earlier arrests in recent years, without explanation or resolution, of a prominent 
lawyer, a political scientist employed by the government, and various Islamists. 
 A mixture of formal and informal participation can be discerned in the development of 
political ‘societies’ as quasi-parties. Political parties are illegal in all six Gulf states. However, 
there is a vast distinction to be made between the absolute prohibition on political organization 
in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, on the one hand, and the emergence of quasi-
parties in Bahrain and Kuwait, generally referred to as ‘societies’. In Bahrain, parties exist in 
all but name. These include both pro-government parties that are mostly Sunni Islamist, such 
as al-Asala and al-Minbar al-Islami. But there are opposition ‘societies’ as well, with the best 
known being al-Wifaq (al-Wefaq, a moderate Shi˓ah party), al-Haq (a more radical Shi˓ah 
party) and the National Democratic Action Society or Wa˓d (Waad, a secular mixed Sunni–
Shi˓ah party embracing the remnants of older socialist, Ba˓thist and Marxist groups). Similar 
‘societies’ are to be found in Kuwait although they have not quite reached the same degree of 
overtly political orientation. The best organized of these are Sunni Islamist groups, such as 
those of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, although the Islamic National Alliance 
Party, a Shi˓ah group, is also prominent. In 2006, a group of Islamists challenged the Kuwaiti 
ban on formal political parties by forming al-Ummah, a self-declared political party. 
 In both states, the societies constitute ideological coalitions pursuing electoral strategies. 
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That is, they operate in effect as political parties. At the same time, however, they may also 
serve as vehicles for sectarian advancement. In that sense, they are more like communal 
organizations and not fully fledged political parties. Both the Bahraini and Kuwaiti 
governments tolerate these societies (although in the case of Bahrain far less so for opposition 
parties after the spring of 2011), in part because pro-government societies provide support for 
and alliance with the governments within the parliamentary settings. In Kuwait, they are also 
alleged to be vehicles for carrying on differences within the ruling family. 
 While the ‘societies’ in both Kuwait and Bahrain operate within the context of those 
countries’ national assemblies, political organization has not always been so straightforward. 
Popular dissatisfaction with Kuwait’s administration resulted in the formation of ad hoc 
‘councils’ in 1921 and 1938 by activists seeking to create a consultative form of political 
participation. Neither was effective or lasting. In the late 1950s, a group of secular 
nationalists, led by Ahmad al-Khatib and connected to the Arab Nationalists’ Movement, 
challenged amiri authority by petition while their attempts to create elected councils were 
thwarted by the government. Nevertheless, a number of this group were elected to the first 
National Assembly in 1963 and their lineage can be traced down to the current set of ‘liberals’ 
(Peterson 1988: 28–37; Crystal 1990: 36–111). 
 Bahrain’s experience with ‘unauthorized’ political protest and organization was even more 
intense than Kuwait’s. Protests by Shi˓ah, Sunnis, students, pearl divers and Bahrain 
Petroleum Company workers took place at irregular intervals throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
These activities culminated in the constitutional movement of 1938, which emerged in parallel 
with the one in Kuwait and similarly failed to achieve success. The period of 1953–6 
witnessed a more serious and more tightly organized opposition movement known as the 
Committee of National Unity. Its modest success in gaining modification of some government 
policies was abruptly overturned in the aftermath of protests against the British participation in 
the Suez War of 1956, and its leaders were arrested, tried and imprisoned – either in Bahrain 
or on St Helena Island in the South Atlantic. 
 Subsequent activities in the 1960s were led by underground Arab nationalist, Ba˓thist and 
even Marxist groups. The more moderate activists among these were elected to the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1972 and the National Assembly in 1973. When the government 
found it was unable to work with the elected assembly, it suspended it in 1975. The effect of 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–8 was to drive a wedge 
between Bahraini Sunnis and Shi˓ah, and the uprisings of the latter half of the 1990s and up to 
the present have been largely Shi˓ah in expression, although Sunni grievances against the 
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regime remained unresolved (Peterson 1988: 64-77; 2002; 2004; 2009). 
 Political organization, let alone sustained dissidence, in the other Gulf states has been far 
more muted. Opposition activities in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s centred on labour strikes at the 
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) and a series of arrests of mostly military personnel, as 
well as a few defections by air force pilots. Since the early 1990s, ‘loyal opposition’ has been 
expressed by a new wave of Islamist religious figures and liberal petitions. The large Shi˓ah 
community of the Eastern Province historically has been oppressed by the government, and 
protests and violence have been a constant if irregular feature since the Iranian Revolution. At 
the far end of the spectrum, reactionary Islamist elements seized the Great Mosque of Makkah 
in 1979 and, inspired by Usamah b. Ladin, carried out a bloody insurgency in the kingdom in 
the mid-2000s.
5
 
 The arrest, detention and/or harassment of human rights activists and petitioners have been 
a recurring feature of the scene in Saudi Arabia since the early 2000s. Even when released 
from detention or house arrest, activists have found their freedoms curtailed and often their 
passports are not returned. In part, this policy has been in effect since the emergence of the 
Sahwah movement of conservative religious figures after the Kuwait War and of numerous 
petitions for reform presented to the king in the years following 9/11. 
 Prominent among those detained have been Islamist reformists such as ˓Abdullah al-
Hamid, associated at one time with al-Sahwah, and Sulayman al-Rashudi, a retired judge, as 
well as liberals such as King Saud University professor Matruk al-Falih. Al-Falih was jailed 
several times in the 2000s while Rashudi and a group of fifteen other associated dissidents 
received jail terms of up to 30 years in November 2011 on charges of forming a secret 
organization and financing terrorism. Another activist and a former media professor, Sa˓id 
Zu˓ayr, was acquitted in February 2012 of similar charges but only after he had spent five 
years in jail. Six were arrested in March 2011 for allegedly planning protests inspired by 
Tunisia and Egypt. Still others faced heavy fines and bans on travel, including at least one 
woman who had committed the offence of driving. 
 Very muted and scattered opposition to the British presence took place in the UAE when 
still known as the Trucial States in the 1960s. In Oman, several small, leftist, nationalist fronts 
sought unsuccessfully to attack the government in the north, sometimes in coordination with 
the Marxist front that carried out the insurgency in Dhufar. 
                                                 
5
 These events have been covered in a number of more comprehensive books on Saudi Arabia. Among those 
works focusing more closely on opposition can be mentioned Hegghammer (2008, 2010), Hegghammer and 
Lacroix (2007), Lacroix (2004, 2005, 2011), Matthiesen (2010), Sager (2005) and Trofimov (2007). 
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5. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
A recent but increasingly important aspect of informal participation comes from the 
emergence of social media and their exponentially increasing use in the Gulf.
6
 The use of 
social media has exploded in the Middle East, especially after the events of early 2011. The 
Arab Social Media Report reported that the number of Facebook users in the Arab world 
nearly doubled between April 2010 and April 2011 to more than 27 million, with more than 6 
million users added in just the first three months of 2011. The highest proportion of users as a 
percentage of population tended to be in the GCC countries, with levels reaching as high as 29 
per cent of the population in the UAE (Salem and Mourtada 2011: 9). Similar results were 
reported for Twitter usage, with Qatar at the highest with nearly 8 per cent of the population 
using it (Salem and Mourtada 2011: 18). A year later, the dramatic increase in use and 
influence of social media was continuing. The number of Facebook users in the Arab world 
grew by 50 per cent between June 2011 and June 2012, and tripled between 2010 and 2012 
(Salem and Mourtada 2012: 7). Twitter usage also grew, prompted in part by Twitter’s 
adoption of an Arabic interface. Kuwait witnessed the highest percentage of population using 
Twitter, at nearly 13 per cent (Salem and Mourtada 2012: 16). 
 Certainly a great deal of this usage is devoted to socializing, making friends, and keeping 
in touch with friends, acquaintances and colleagues. However, intellectuals and others 
interested in political affairs (domestic, regional and international) have taken to the use of 
social media with a vengeance. One of the best-known tweeters is Sultan Saud al-Qasimi of 
the UAE, who posts political criticism frequently in addition to regular editorials in a variety 
of media, and a recent study named him as the most connected tweeter in the Middle East. The 
same study also found that 78 per cent of the top fifty Middle East tweeters used the medium 
to discuss politics as well as sharing news, and that political and government officials are 
increasingly using Twitter (http://notebook.portland-communications.com/2012/11/how-the-
middle-east-tweets-en). 
 Not surprisingly, social media are dangerous to governments because they are extremely 
difficult to control and they diffuse so rapidly and broadly throughout the politically active 
community. As a consequence, governments up and down the Gulf have acted strongly to 
arrest and jail those seen as threats on multiple occasions. While most of these arrests have 
had a political nature, other bloggers and tweeters have been arrested on charges of insulting 
Islam. But this may have a political twist to it as well: one Shi˓i was arrested in Bahrain on the 
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 For the purpose of this paper, relevant forms of social media include websites, listservs, YouTube, Facebook, 
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accusation of slandering the Prophet Muhammad’s wife in a forum in retaliation for Sunni 
attacks on Shi˓ah, while a Saudi tweeted what were regarded as blasphemous remarks against 
the Prophet Muhammad – the Saudi fled the country but was extradited from Malaysia and 
detained amid calls for his execution. A Kuwaiti received a 10-year jail sentence for insulting 
the Prophet Muhammad and criticizing the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 
 Even Kuwait has resorted to legal charges for challenges expressed on social media: a 
Kuwait University professor was detained on charges of using a Twitter account to slander the 
amir while a distant member of the ruling family and tweeter was arrested for expressing 
offensive political views. Since 2006, Oman has cracked down on bloggers and individuals 
posting comments on Internet forums such as the widely read Sebla, which for years has 
received a plethora of comments critical of the government. Six people were convicted in 
September 2012 of slander and of violation of the ‘information technology’ law, and were 
sentenced to jail terms of one and a half years as well as assessed fines of 1,000 Omani riyals. 
In the same month, the utility of social media was demonstrated once again when calls for a 
demonstration against the US embassy because of a US-produced anti-Islam film were 
circulated by mobile phone applications. Bloggers have been among those arrested and 
convicted in the UAE. 
 Discussion and the exchange of views via social media have provided an advantage over 
physical demonstrations, both in terms of the difficulties in arranging such forbidden displays 
and in maintaining anonymity for participants. As one Islamist arrested in the UAE expressed 
it, Twitter is the UAE’s Tahrir Square (Financial Times, 18 June 2012). Electronic debates 
between pro-government and opposition supporters have emerged in all the states and new 
political groupings have developed online. Outspoken Dubai police chief Dahi Khalfan is an 
inveterate tweeter, as are many religious figures: one Saudi Islamic scholar has amassed more 
than 1.8 million followers (Financial Times, 18 June 2012). 
 Bahrain has displayed the heaviest reliance on the new media, including websites, for 
political purposes. In part, this has served as an avenue for disseminating information and 
opinion. The volume of tweets roughly doubled for the days around the 14 February 2011 
demonstrations (Salem and Mourtada 2011: 19). The website of Bahrain Online, which 
offered a popular forum for discussing politics, was censored around the same time and its 
founder was detained.
7
 But the instantaneous capabilities of Twitter and SMS have meant that 
                                                                                                                                                         
blogs, instant messaging, text messages (SMS) and Twitter. 
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 See the Bahrain extract from a CNN program on the social media during the Arab awakening at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zB2DeZBgTEk. The charge that CNN buried the program after showing it once is 
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marches and demonstrations can be organized on the fly and participants advised to gather in 
specified locations very quickly. This has been a hallmark in particular of the Bahrain 
situation and the 14 February Coalition (described below). One of the charges against activist 
Nabeel Rajab (of which he was later acquitted by an appeals court) was defaming the prime 
minister in a tweet. 
6. FACTIONALISM WITHIN RULING FAMILIES AND DIFFERING VIEWS ON DEMOCRATIZATION 
The future of political participation, whether formal or informal, in the Gulf may well be 
advanced – or impeded – by factionalism within ruling families. The question of the ‘king’s 
dilemma’ arises in this respect, complicated by a necessary expansion into the ‘king and ruling 
family’s dilemma’. It has been postulated for decades in at least some of the Gulf states that 
prominent ruling family members have held variant views on the political future of monarchy 
and its role in their states. This can be roughly expressed as liberals vs. hardliners. That is, 
liberals are defined as those who believe in a loosening of power, expansion of participatory 
institutions, and devolution of authority from ruling families to the people. Hardliners are 
those who resist any change for fear of undermining the basis of monarchical rule. 
 The classic example is that of the Free Princes in Saudi Arabia who fled the kingdom 
during the reign of King Sa˓ud (r. 1953–64). They returned to Saudi Arabia a few years later 
but even today, one of them, Talal b. ˓Abd al-˓Aziz (a half-brother of King ˓Abdullah), 
continues to speak out on political and social issues. A comparable example is that of Tariq b. 
Taymur Al Sa˓id in Oman, who left the country in opposition to his half-brother, Sultan Sa˓id 
b. Taymur (r. 1932–70). Tariq organized other political exiles, proclaimed his intention to 
overthrow his brother and even distributed a constitution that he wished to institute. When 
Sultan Sa˓id was overthrown by his son Qabus in 1970, Tariq returned to Muscat as prime 
minister, but fell out with his nephew less than two years later and never again played a 
prominent role in government. 
 In the early days of the events in Bahrain in 2011, it was widely held that Crown Prince 
Salman b. Hamad was arguing within family councils that greater accommodation should be 
reached with the opposition, while his great-uncle and prime minister for more than forty 
years, Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman, continued to resist fiercely any change – regarding it as 
capitulation – as he had in the past. King Hamad b. ˓Isa was seen as being in the middle. At 
the time of writing, however, it must be concluded that if a liberal wing of the Al Khalifah 
                                                                                                                                                         
discussed in a blog by Glenn Greenwald on the Guardian website, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/04/cnn-
international-documentary-bahrain-arab-spring-repression?newsfeed=true. 
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exists, it has had little or no influence on government policy. 
 It can also be speculated that generational change within ruling families will bring an 
increased spirit of accommodation to changing realities. Younger members of families are 
seen as more educated, more cosmopolitan and more aware of political change around the 
world. But there are at least two contradictory conclusions that carry weight. First, these 
younger members have grown up in a world of privilege and it is unlikely that many would 
jeopardize the benefits they enjoy in the absence of overwhelming pressure; indeed, the 
opposite is more likely to occur. Second, in a variation of Acton’s dictum that power corrupts 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely, responsibility and power are more likely than not to 
change liberal attitudes. Those family members who express reformist sympathies in their 
youth may well revert to conservative defensive attitudes as they increase their stakes in the 
system. 
 A universal approach in the Gulf to political criticism and dissidence has been co-optation, 
and the recent history of the region is littered with names of prominent officials and merchants 
who were outspoken critics in their youth. This process may extend to ruling families as well 
as the rest of society. It is sometimes held that a generational change in Saudi leadership, away 
from the sons of King ˓Abd al-˓Aziz to his grandsons or even great-grandsons, may produce a 
more liberal, reformist approach to governing. But would the succession of Prince Turki al-
Faysal, for example, to Prince Nayif b. ˓Abd al-˓Aziz or Prince Salman b. ˓Abd al-˓Aziz result 
in a truly significant change of direction? 
 There is also the view that a modernizing monarch need not be a liberal one, that is, that 
the two notions do not necessarily go hand in hand. For example, Shaykh Muhammad b. 
Rashid Al Maktum, the ruler of Dubai, has embraced a radical approach to the transformation 
of Dubai from an Arab regional entrepôt to a truly cosmopolitan and hugely ambitious global 
city. There is no political liberalism in his vision. In fact, only Sultan Qabus in Oman rules 
more single-handedly that Shaykh Muhammad, who defers little even to his brothers and 
restricts participation (in the sense of advice and counsel as well as execution) to a very small 
circle of lieutenants. Where Sultan Qabus has made slow and cautious moves towards formal 
participation, Shaykh Muhammad has not. Furthermore, he seems to have little regular contact 
with any of his citizens outside his inner circle. 
 There are only two states in which generational and factional change has had any impact 
on political participation. Shaykh Hamad b. Khalifah’s coup in Qatar ushered in an era of 
apparent liberalization of government as well as an ambitious and controversial foreign policy. 
Still, while Qatar has definitely modernized, Shaykh Hamad remains in full control and even 
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his promise for an elected parliament remains unfulfilled. In Kuwait, there has been some 
cautious optimism about a younger generation of Al Sabah replacing the sclerotic elders. The 
foreign minister and later deputy prime minister, Dr Muhammad al-Salim Al Sabah, was 
regarded as a good illustration of a younger, educated (Harvard PhD), capable member who 
could be groomed for leadership. But his political career seemed sidelined when he resigned in 
2011 under fire from National Assembly members for alleged involvement in corruption. In 
the end, internecine battles within the family seem to be related more to personal disputes and 
struggles for power than to debates over the pace and extent of political change. 
7. THE ‘SOCIAL CONTRACT’ AND THE ARAB REVOLUTION 
Notions of the absence of effective popular participation in Arab politics were turned on their 
head during the spring of 2011. As some commentators have pointed out, reference to these 
events as the ‘Arab Spring’ tends to belittle their importance. Rather than a brief success 
against tyranny such as took place in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the 
collective spirit of activism and the claiming of rights have taken on the air of revolution. 
Nevertheless, apart from Bahrain and to a lesser extent Oman, the 2011 Arab uprising has 
scarcely touched the Gulf states, at least on the surface. One assessment holds that ‘The gusty 
winds of Arab Spring impacted the political and ruling elites in the GCC states more than it 
impacted the Gulf people and masses’ (AlShayji 2012).8 But it could well be that a deeper 
transformation of attitudes towards the legitimacy of monarchical and paternalistic leadership 
is taking place beneath the relatively placid surface of Gulf society. 
 The relationship between ruler and ruled in the Gulf heretofore can be described in terms 
of a ‘social contract’. That is, paternalistic regimes promise prosperity, order and a freedom to 
pursue a socially and economically satisfying life, in exchange for the acceptance of full state 
control of politics. The state assumes the mantle of responsibility for guiding and supervising 
society while the citizenry eschews political participation. Within this framework, the 
occasional dissenting refrain has been for reform of the system, to make it work as it is 
morally (and traditionally) obligated. The governing role of the ruler and his family is 
accepted in principle, but the ruling family is expected to adhere to the social contract. When 
it does not, the bolder of the people express their demands for a fairer, more transparent 
system that embraces more economic equity and less corruption. When governments feel 
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Al Shayji (2012) also contends: ‘On the other hand, the Arab Spring has emboldened the Gulf masses and raised 
the bar of political demands and reforms within those states.’ Nevertheless, he concludes ‘It has pushed the GCC 
leadership to play the leading role in the Arab world. That is a clear indication of the resilience of these regimes 
and a sign that the GCC’s moment in history as the new leader in the region and the Arab world has arrived.’ 
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themselves pressed by these demands, they may enact modest changes that promise slightly 
more participation – but these are always clearly presented as ‘gifts’ of the regime, not an 
acknowledgement of the rights of the people. 
 Much has been made of the decisions in Saudi Arabia and Oman to provide greater 
economic benefits to their citizenry, a tactic derided by Western media as ‘buying off’ dissent. 
But in fact this may simply reflect a time-tested mechanism of feedback and response. The 
Gulf states, while autocratic and paternalistic, have exhibited a parallel tradition of listening to 
their people. When they do not, acceptable expressions of criticism may escalate into more 
visible discontent. This seems to have been the case in Oman. The country is relatively poor 
compared to the rest of the GCC and its elites have displayed an all-too-familiar pattern of 
using their status and positions to amass wealth. Still, the chorus of dissent that erupted in the 
spring of 2011 and continued through much of the summer seemed to focus on restoration of 
the social contract, demanding reform but not revolution. 
 On the other hand, Bahrain provides a potential example of the severe fraying, if not 
dissolution, of the Gulf social contract. The reaction of the Al Khalifah to expressed 
opposition in 2011 was extreme and focused on repression rather than reform or dialogue. The 
security situation reverted to the atmosphere of the 1990s uprising. Indeed, it was even worse, 
with arrests of doctors and nurses and indiscriminate attacks, both verbal and physical, on 
extensive numbers of Shi˓ah, even those who had cooperated with the government. The 
regime resorted to demonizing opponents, engaging in naked intimidation through an 
expatriate-heavy security apparatus, and actively seeking to delegitimize its majority Shi˓ah 
population, as expressed through extensive arrests and the destruction of numerous Shi˓ah 
mosques. Twenty activists were convicted of seeking to overthrow the state and sentenced to 
jail terms of various lengths, eight of them life imprisonment. 
 One of the negative effects of the events of 2011 was the polarization of many Sunnis and 
Shi˓ah into opposing and often hostile camps. In part, this seemed to be a deliberate regime 
strategy to mobilize Sunni support against the Shi˓ah opposition by inculcating the fear that 
the Shi˓ah wanted to replace the monarchy with a republic with Iranian help. A government-
inspired Sunni Gathering movement emerged.
9
 
 The idea of a monolithic regime, however, should be treated with some caution. Indeed, 
many Bahraini observers contend that the ruling Al Khalifah have split into opposing camps. 
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This and the following paragraphs are based on various news reporting and on discussions in Bahrain in 
February 2012. 
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The heir apparent, Salman b. Hamad, is regarded as the member of the family most willing to 
seek dialogue and thus resolution, as shown by his announcement on 13 March 2011 about a 
willingness to discuss parliamentary reform, naturalization, corruption and sectarian issues. 
This initiative was rendered moot when GCC Peninsula Shield (but mainly Saudi) troops 
crossed into Bahrain the following day. 
 The hardline faction of the family is headed by Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman, the prime 
minister, who seemed to be virtually on the point of retirement, with his nephew King Hamad 
b. ˓Isa in the ascendancy, before February 2011. It is possible that Shaykh Khalifah saw an 
opportunity in the emerging unrest to regain his position vis-à-vis the king and coordinated the 
Peninsula Shield movement with Riyadh, as well as forming a new alliance with fellow 
hardliners Shaykh Khalid b. Ahmad (the minister of the royal court) and Shaykh Khalifah b. 
Ahmad (the minister of defence), and gaining operational control over the Bahrain Defence 
Force (previously the preserve of the king and the heir apparent). 
 The sustained impasse well into 2012 between government and opposition, with its weekly 
if not daily diet of violence and arrests, brings a danger of polarization in opposition ranks in 
addition to the deep cleavages in Bahraini society. The most powerful opposition society, al-
Wifaq, along with its ally Wa˓d, reversed its original position about boycotting the first 
elections to the Majlis al-Nawwab (Chamber of Deputies) in 2002 and participated in the 
elections of 2006 and 2010. This prompted hardliners within al-Wifaq to form their own party, 
al-Haq, which continued to boycott elections on the grounds that fighting elections to a non-
representative parliament only validated the regime’s refusal to share power. After the 2011 
unrest began, Hasan Mushayma˓, the most prominent leader of al-Haq, and other allied figures 
were arrested and sentenced to prison terms on charges of plotting to overthrow the regime. 
 But the spectre of an even deeper split still threatens. While al-Wifaq and Wa˓d publicly 
remain open to dialogue with the government, the activism in the streets and Shi˓ah villages is 
orchestrated in large part by the 14 February Coalition. The protests in the villages and 
attempts to occupy key locations, including the iconic Pearl Roundabout, are carried out 
mainly by young activists, teenagers or in their early twenties. Behind them exists a secretive 
collective organization that prioritizes targets and orchestrates flash mobs through Twitter 
messages. The existence of any central committee that may control the coalition remains 
secret, even to the mainstream opposition. It is this coalition that rejects compromise and 
demands the removal of the Al Khalifah. Furthermore, it is this coalition that threatens to 
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garner increasing loyalty as the government refuses to back down.
10
 
 There has always been a very small number of Bahrainis who have advocated the 
replacement of the regime by a republic. But the events of 2011 saw this minority view 
transformed into a rallying cry of a growing number of Bahrainis. After this development, 
what makes Bahrain different from, for example, Syria? Admittedly, the violence in Bahrain 
has not reached Syrian levels and the Al Khalifah have not been as ruthless as the Bashshar al-
Asad regime. But fundamentally the reaction has been virtually the same: repression, 
intimidation, mass arrests, destruction of property and torture. In essence, they are both 
hereditary suppressive states. 
 The effects of the Arab unrest of 2011 could be seen elsewhere in the GCC. In Kuwait, the 
bidun, the Arab tribal population denied citizenship, evinced growing activism in the belief 
that the hadar (urban citizens) have marginalized them. In their struggle for recognition, they 
have struck alliances with the badu (Bedouin citizens) because they come from the same tribes 
and citizenship for the bidun would give the badu greater influence in the emirate. The badu 
already enjoy a majority of the seats in the National Assembly and they are becoming 
increasingly Islamist and in opposition to the government.
11
 
 The UAE government has engaged in a series of arrests of mostly Islamist citizens, with 
particular emphasis on members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The first wave occurred in April 
2011 when a group that became known as the UAE Five was arrested for signing an Internet 
petition calling for constitutional changes and free elections. They were convicted in 
November of insulting the country’s leadership and endangering national security, then almost 
immediately pardoned. The numbers in custody reached as many as fifty by mid-2012. Seven 
naturalized citizens among those arrested were stripped of their citizenship in December 2011; 
at least one was deported – to Thailand, where he had never been before. Another round took 
place in September 2012 with eight new arrests and the forcible move of Shaykh Sultan al-
Qasimi, a member of the Ra’s al-Khaymah ruling family, and another Islamist from house 
arrest in Ra’s al-Khaymah to confinement in Abu Dhabi. 
 The Arab unrest directly inspired protests in Oman, complete with an occupation of 
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Jones and al-Shehabi (2012) assert that ‘The Coalition operates more as a collective than a traditional 
organization. It relies on a broad base of supporters who first generate ideas for dissent or particular kinds of 
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almost every protest today, banners bearing revolutionary slogans are also adorned with the small logo of the 
“Coalition.” Its inclusion is not just a symbol of affiliation, but it is also a signal of the power of decentralization 
and community, and is representative of the new kind of mass politics that has swept the region more generally.’ 
11
 Interviews in the Gulf, February 2012. See also the assessment of Kuwaiti electoral politics by Ghanim 
Alnajjar on the Carnegie Endowment website on 8 March 2012. 
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Suhar’s Globe Roundabout, inspired by Tahrir Square in Cairo. The demonstrations in various 
parts of the country were generated principally by economic grievances but also contained a 
political emphasis. Like Bahrain, Oman is one of the poorer cousins of the GCC and 
burgeoning unemployment has afflicted ever-growing numbers of secondary school graduates. 
Sultan Qabus b. Sa˓id addressed the demonstrators’ complaints by announcing the creation of 
50,000 jobs as well as improving welfare benefits and raising government salaries and 
pensions. In addition, publicly voiced complaints against corruption in high places prompted 
the sultan to dismiss a number of government officials and a third of his cabinet, including the 
ministers of the Sultan’s Office, the Royal Court, National Economy, and Commerce and 
Industry, as well as the inspector-general of the Royal Oman Police. A further pledge to 
increase the powers of the Majlis al-Shura and its sister institution, the Majlis al-Dawlah, had 
not been disclosed or implemented by mid-2012. All this dampened demonstrations but did 
not put an end to them.
12
 
 In recent years, Oman has acted harshly against political activists and those critical of the 
government. As early as 2005, two activists were sentenced to prison terms for protesting the 
government’s harsh treatment of demonstrators against the arrests of a group of alleged Ibadi 
Islamists. One of these, Tayyibah al-Ma˓wuli, had been a member of the Majlis al-Shura and 
one of the charges against her was using a mobile phone and the Internet to insult government 
officials. 
 In following years, more action was taken against users of social media and organizers of 
the Internet forum Sebla. Patience with demonstrators in 2011 was short-lived as the Globe 
Roundabout in Suhar, which had been occupied by protesters for a month, was stormed by the 
army and some of its occupiers arrested. Two protesters died, apparently from rubber bullets 
fired by the police. These measures were not enough to silence protests, however. These 
continued to take place throughout the country and were combined with strikes against major 
economic concerns such as the oil company in Muscat and one of the country’s principal 
industrial estates just outside the capital, while a protesters’ camp was maintained outside the 
Majlis al-Shura. Government action in disrupting demonstrations and encampments outside 
government buildings was followed by arrests of human rights activists. Around a hundred 
demonstrators and activists were sentenced to jail terms in the second half of 2011 and more 
arrests followed in 2012. Another wave of convictions took place in August and September 
2012. 
                                                 
12 
Most of these paragraphs are summarized from Peterson (2011). 
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 Effects elsewhere were more muted. While most of Saudi Arabia remained quiet, 
intimidated by a strong security presence, disturbances in the Shi˓ah areas of the Eastern 
Province picked up amidst allegations of heavy government repression.
13
 However, another 
six were held in detention indefinitely on charges that they had planned to take part in a ‘Day 
of Rage’ protest on 11 March 2011, inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt. The UAE 
saw the arrests of bloggers and other activists discussed above. Only Qatar seemed immune to 
any visible signs of agitation. 
 This development is new, mostly, to the Gulf states. Certainly governments have engaged 
in intimidation and arrests in the past and present. The wave of arrests in Saudi Arabia in the 
1960s in an atmosphere of coup attempts and the detention of bloggers and Islamists in the 
UAE since the early 2000s come to mind. Still, it is clear that the events of 2011 and 2012 
have changed the perceptions of many citizens about the roles of ruling families. As one Gulf 
intellectual summarized it, ruling families are almost totally without comprehension of the 
way things should be handled and how things are done in the modern age. They try to 
marginalize or dissemble traditional institutions, such as the majlis, the use of which has 
declined markedly. The families think in terms of the way things used to work and privileges. 
They have educated generations of PhDs, engineers and other professions, and somehow do 
not seem to realize what these educated members of their societies have learned or 
experienced beyond their studies and disciplines (interview in Kuwait, April 2012). 
 Has the Arab Revolution of 2011 and the deterioration of ruler–ruled relations in Bahrain 
put the implicit social contract in the Gulf monarchies on the table for debate? Have the events 
of 2011 and 2012 provoked regimes into contemplating the necessity of increased 
participation or have they created a belligerent backlash?
14
 Is the Saudi response to unrest in 
Bahrain – that is, the sending of troops to Bahrain under the guise of the Peninsula Shield – a 
                                                 
13 
Prominent Saudi critic Madawi Al-Rasheed (2012) remarked that ‘Saudi Arabia’s experience of the Arab 
Spring demonstrates that it lacks the structural conditions for mobilization, organization, and protest, let alone 
revolution. The economic and social deprivation, political oppression, and corruption that triggered revolutions 
elsewhere are all present in Saudi Arabia, but these alone are not sufficient to precipitate an uprising.’ Her 
conclusion is sobering: ‘If the delayed Arab Spring eventually reaches Saudi Arabia, it will likely be a bloody 
affair. Violent opposition is nothing new in Saudi Arabia, where jihadis have fought the state since 2003, and 
regime opponents took up arms in 1927, 1965, and 1979. In the absence of a tradition of peaceful protest and in 
the face of religiously sanctioned bans on even nonviolent activism, aggression against the regime and its 
enablers may again become the only option.’ 
14 
There is also the contention that the effect of 2011 events has caused some Gulf citizens to withdraw, 
figuratively speaking, to the safety of the bosom of their home-grown regimes. For example, a poll in Qatar 
indicated that ‘The proportion of survey respondents who report being “interested” or “very interested” in politics 
decreased by almost 20 percent over [the first half of 2011], while the proportion of Qataris who say that living in 
a democratic country is “very important” to them dropped from 74 percent to 65 percent, a relative decrease of 12 
percent’ (Gengler 2011). 
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special case because of especially close Saudi–Bahraini ties, or simply the clearest instance of 
GCC ruling families circling the wagons in defence? 
 The answers to these questions are likely to be visible in the near future – measured by the 
coming years and not decades. Successful responses will depend primarily on the willingness 
of ruling families to respond positively to growing demands for reform and participation. But 
it must be said that the record so far does not leave much ground for optimism. 
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